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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'l'lLi\.DE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
S'l1 A'l1 J1J OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SKAGG8 DRlTCl CENTT~RS, INC.,
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, INC.,
(J.J,/a W,\RSHA\V'S GIANT FOOD
and UHAND CENTRAL DRUGS, INC.,
Def e 11dants-Res po 11dcnts,

Case No.
11034

"\ ~D lrrl ,:\H I-n<~'l'AIL GROCERS'
ASSOCTA '11 ION,
In tcrvenor-AzJpcllant.
1

P·etition for Rehearing
'l'he clefe11da11t, Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., (hereinufler calk·d, "Skaggs"), petitioner in the above entitled

case No. 11034, in which a decision was filed by this
eomt on November 1, 1968, ren~rsing a jndgment of
tlH· Dit-ltrict Court of Salt Lake Connty, Utah, hereby
1·<·spt•dfnll~Y p<c•titions the court for a rehearing, and in
~ll[lport thereof represrnts:
1. '1'he Supreme Court failed to consider or rule
upon tlw tliird defense of Skaggs to Count II of plain1

tiff's complaint and failed to considPr the finding11 of
fact and conclusions of law of the trial court with respect
thereto which found that Skaggs had offered the goods
in question for sale in an endeavor to meet the price
of its competitor and which concluded Section 13-5-12( d)
of the Utah Unfair Practices Act to be unconstitutionally
vague and ambiguous and unenforceable if construed as
requiring a retailer to determine at his peril whether
a competitor's price is "legal."
2. The Supreme Court failed to consider or rule
upon the Second Defense of Skaggs' to Count III of
plaintiff's complaint and the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court with respect thereto
which concluded that the giving away of an item of
merchandise in connection with a sale, is not prohibited
by the Utah Unfair Practices Act.
3. The Supreme Court failed to consider the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court
with respect to Count IV of plaintiff's complaint which
found that the sale in question was not made by Skaggs
,vith the intent and purpose of unfairly diverting trade
from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor bnt
was made with the sole purpose of inducing the purchase
of other merchandise by its own customers and which
concluded that a sale made with such intent cannot he
constitutionally prohibited by the legislature.
4. The Supreme Court failed to consider or rnle
upon the defense of Skaggs that the Utah Unfair Practices Act is unconstitutional because of its unjustifiable
discrimination between parties similarly situated.
2

5. The Supreme Court apparently overlooked the
testimony at the trial establishing the fact that it is
impossible to prove the actual cost of selling an item of
merchandise and establishing that credits and rebates
cannot be applied to an item of merchandise at the time
a retailer sets the price of that merchandise for sale.
6. The Supreme Court overlooked controlling principles of constitutional law in holding that the unfair
practices act is not unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.
7. The Supreme Court apparently misread the presumption of illegal intent which is created by Section
13-5-9 ( 2) of the Utah Unfair Practices Act and apparently overlooked the testimony at the trial and controlling principles of constitutional law concerning such
presumption in connection with Count VI of plaintiff's
complaint.
8. The Supreme Court apparently overlooked its
own vrior decisions in holding that the Utah Unfair
Praetices Act does not violate Article XII, Section 20
of the Utah Constitution.
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Brief in Support of P'etition
ARGUMENT
In addition to the constitutionality of the Utah Unfair Practices Act, the defendant Skaggs raised other
def ens es to certain of the counts in plaintiff's complaint.
These defenses required the trial court to make interpretation of various sections of the Act and all of the interpretations of the Act by the trial court were before the
Supreme Court on appeal. Among the questions raised
were: (a) Whether a retailer in meeting prices of his
competitor comes within the exemption set forth in 135-12( d) of the Act where his competitor's price is below
cost as defined by the Act, and what the retailer must
do in order to come within that exemption; (b) Whetlwr
the giving away of an item of merchandise in connection
·with a sale is prohibited by the Act; ( c) ·whether a sak
below cost as defined by the Act which is made with
the sole purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise can be constitutionally prohibited by the Act:
( d) The interpretation of the presumption of illegal
intent created by Section 13-5-9 ( 2) of the Act. Tltl'
answers to these questions were not given by the Supreme Court although they were before it on appeal.
Obtaining the answers to these questions is important
since if the Act is held constitutional, these questions
'
involving the interpretation of the Act determine ·wl1etl1l'r
or not Skaggs has other valid defenses to the conn ts set
forth in plaintiff's complaint. The determination of
these questions is probably even more important to tlw
Utah Retail Industry as a whok, since wit110nt the r.n4

swers to these questions a retailer will not know what
he may or may not do in the fuure to avoid violating
the Act.
Obtaining the Supreme Court's answers to the foregoing questions is important of course, only if the court
clPtcrrnines that the Act is constitutional. It is Skaggs
01Jinion that the Act is unconstitutional and that the Sulll'PllW Court failed to consider constitutional questions
raised on appeal and overlooked controlling principles
of constitutional law and prior decisions of this court in
holding- the Act constitutional.
It is respectfully submitted that a rehearing should
he granted so that the court can reexamine its holding
ihat the Act is constitutional and so that if the court
continues to hold the Act constitutional the vital questions inYolving the interpretation of the Act, which have
not hP('H passed uvon by this court, can be resoked.
POINT I.
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER
OR RULE UPON THE THIRD DEFENSE OF
SKAGGS TO COUNT II OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF
THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT THERETO,
WHICH FOUND THAT SKAGGS HAD OFFERED
THE GOODS IN QUESTION FOR SALE IN AN ENDEAVOR TO MEET THE PRICE OF ITS COMPETITOR, AND WHICH CONCLUDED SECTION 13-512( d) OF THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT TO
BE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS
AND UNENFORCEABLE IF CONSTRUED AS REQUIRING A RETAILER TO DETERMINE AT HIS
PERIL WHETHER A COMPETITOR'S PRICE IS
"LEGAL."

Count II of plainiff's complaint alleged that on June
23, 1966, Skaggs advertised and sold Style Hair Spray
for 49¢, which was less than cost as defined by Section
13-5-7 of the Utah Unfair Practices Act. In answer to
this count Skaggs alleged that on or about June 16, 1966,
Shoppers Discount, a competitor of Skaggs, advertised
and sold Aqua Net Hair Spray at 49¢ and that tlw
advertisement by Skaggs of Style Hair Spray at 49¢
was made in an endeavor by Skaggs to meet the price of
Shoppers Discount on Aqua Net Hair Spray and was
accordingly exempt under the provision of Section 13-512 ( d) which provides :
"13-5-12 Sales Exempt from Act. The Provisions of this Act shall not apply to any sale made:
"(d) in an endeavor made in good faith to
meet legal prices of a competitor as herein defined selling the same article, product or commodity in the same locality or trade area."
In connection with Count II of plaintiff's complaint,
the trial ocurt found that on or about J nne lG, 1966,
Shopper's Discount advertised and sold Aqua Net hair
spray at 49¢ which was a sale below cost as defined by
the Act. On June 23, 1966, Skaggs advertised Style hair
spray at 49¢ which was a sale below cost as defined by
the Act. Aqua Net hair spray and Style hair spray are
comparable products with regard to weight, size, use,
price and customer dt>mand. Shopper's Discount and
Skaggs are competitors in the same locality or trade
area comprising Salt Lake City and Davis County.
Skaggs' advertisement and sale of Style hair spray at
49¢ was made in an endeavor by Skaggs to meet the 49¢
G

price of Shopper's Discount on Aqua Net hair spray.
Skaggs had no actual knowledge that the Shoppers' Discount price on Aqua Net hair spray was not a legal
price under the provisions of Section 13-5-12 of the Act.
Aqua Net hair spray is a product with wide wholesale
priee fluctuations which can be purchased by retailers,
including Skaggs and Shopper's Discount in numerous
\mys and from many different suppliers. Skaggs had
not made any inquiry of Shopper's Discount or of the
trnppliers of Aqua Net hair spray to determine the in-v-oice cost of Aqua Net hair spray to Shopper's Discount.
f;hoppPr's Discount as a competitor of Skaggs would not
-.;olnntarily supply defendant's with information relative
to its invoice cost, replacement cost or date of purchase
of the item, and wide price fluctuation and numerous
wholesalt> sources of supply and differing purchase
methods made it infeasible and unrealistic for Skaggs to
ohtain reliable information of invoice costs, replacement
('Osb, or date of purchase of Aqua Net hair spray by
Nhopper's Discount.
'ThP trial court concluded that Skaggs was entitled

tc. med the price of Shopper's Discount and to assume
that the advertised price of Shopper's Discount was a
legal price in the absence of actual knowledge of an
i11eg-al sale by Shopper's Discount in violation of the
ud and. that Section 13-5-12 ( d) would be unconstitutional if construed as requiring a retailer to determine
at hi:-; iwril wlwtlwr his competitor's price is "legal."
'l'he Utah Supreme Court did not consider the defrrnw of Skaggs to Count II of plaintiff's complaint or
7

the findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
to this defense, although the matter was presented to
the Supreme Court on appeal.

It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
trial court on this point should be affirmed. As stated
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth vs. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 At.2d 67 (1940),
''How could a merchant know whether a selling price
which he proposed to fix was legal because it met the
"legal price of a competitor for merchandise of the same
grade, quantity and quality? How could such a legal
price of a competitor be ascertairn•d without examining
the competitor's books in order to determine whether
his price was legal?" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
\Vent on to hold the Pennsylvania Unfair Practices Act
unconstitutional on the grounds it was so vague, indefinite and incapable of practical application as to make
its enforcement a violation of due process.
A provision of the New Jersey e nfair Practices Act
identical to Section 13-5-12( d) of the Utah Act was held
unconstitutional by the New Jersey Supreme Conrt in
the case of State vs. Packard-Barnbergcr and Co., 1~3
N. J. 180, 8 At.2d 291 (1939) wherein the court statt>d:
"how a person is to d!c~t<'rm;ne the legality of
the price of a competitor is not declared and the
impracticality if not irnpossibilit)' of determining
the legality of a competitor's price is ob,·ions."
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POINT II.
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER OR
TO RULE UPON THE SECOND DEFENSE OF
SKAGGS TO COUNT III OF THE PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT AND THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT
WITH RESPECT THERETO WHICH CONCLUDED
THAT THE GIVING AWAY OF AN ITEM OF MERCHANDISE IN CONNECTION WITH A SALE IS
IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE UTAH UNFAIR
PRACTICES ACT.

Count III of plaintiff's complaint alleged that on
or about June 20, 1966, Skaggs advertised a carton of
cigarettes for $2.73 and gave a cigarette lighter away
free with t>ach purchase of a carton, which lighter cost
f-lkaggs .25 each. The carton of cigarettes alone was not
a sale below cost as defined by the Act but the price
of the combined articles, cigarettes and lighters, was a
sale below cost as defined by the Act. In answer to this
Count, Skaggs contended that the facts alleged did not
eonstitutv a violation of the Act since the giving away
of an article of merchandise in connection with a sale
is not prohibited by the Act. The trial court held that
the facts alleged in Count III of plaintiff's complaint did
not eonstitutf> a violation of the Act because the sale of
the cigarettes alone was not a sale below cost as defined
h>· the Act and the gift of the cigarette lighter was not
prohibited by the Act. The Supreme Court did not consider this defense of Skaggs to Count III of the complaint although the matter was presented to the Supreme
Comt on appeal.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
trial court on this point should be affirmed.

Prior to the 1965 amendment of the Act, the first
sentence of Section 13-5-9 of the Act read as follows:
the purpose of preventing evasion of the
provisions of this Act, in all sales involving more
than one item or commodity and in all sales involving the giving of any concession of any kind
whatsoever (whether it be coupons or otherwise)
the vendors or distributors selling price shall not
be below the cost of all articles, products, commodities, and concession included in such transactions."
''~'or

The emphasized portions of the Act which precluded
the giving away of items were deleted by the 1965 legislature and the Act as it now reads does not prohibit
giveaways. In ach of thefollowing cases, the courts have
held that Unfair Practices Acts do not prohibit the giving
away of items in connection with salPs unless the Act
in question specifically prohibits such action: State vs.
Tanker Gas, Inc., 250 Wisconsin 218, 26 N.vV. 2d (1947);
United Retail Grocers Association vs. IIarrisoH & Sons,
Inc. 89 Pa. D&C 294 (1954); State of Mi11nesota vs. Avplebaurn's Food Market, Inc., 259 Minnesota 209, 106 N.W.
2d 896 (1960).
As this court so forcefully pointed out in its opinion
in this case, it is not the province of thP court to pass
upon the wi~dom of legislation. The court should voluntarily restrain itself by holding strictly to an exercise
and expression of its power to interpret and adjudicate.
The court should state what the law is, not what it thinks
it should be. Prior to 1965 the Utah Unfair Practices
Act prohibited the giving away of items in connection
with a sale. The legislature amended the Act in 1965
10

and eliminated this prohibition. Regardless of what the
court thinks concerning the wisdom of this amendment,
the conrt should not rewrite the statute and thereby
follow the example of unrestrained judicial activism
practiced by certain other courts.
POINT III
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW OF TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO
COUNT IV OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WHICH
FOUND THAT THE SALE IN QUESTION WAS NOT
MADE BY SKAGGS WITH THE INTENT AND
PURPOSE OF UNFAIRLY DIVERTING TRADE
FROM A COMPETITOR OR OTHERWISE INJURING
A COMPETITOR BUT WAS MADE WITH THE
SOLE PURPOSE OF INDUCING THE PURCHASE
OF OTHER MERCHANDISE BY ITS OWN CUSTOMERS AND WHICH CONCLUDED THAT A SALE
MADE WITH SUCH AN INTENT COULD NOT BE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED BY THE LEGISLATURE.

With respect to Count IV of plaintiff's complaint,
the trial conrt found that on June 16, 1966, Skaggs adYNti st"d in the Provo Daily Herald the sale of Vimanal
Vitamins at 82¢ per lmndred tablets, which was less than
(:Ost as dt•fined by the Act. In the Provo, Utah trade
an•a Vimanal Vitamins are offered for sale exclusively
hy Skaggs and Skaggs has no competitor with respect
to this item. This sale of Vimanal Vitamins was made by
:-lkaggs with the intent of inducing customers at its Provo,
r tali store to purchase other merchandise, bnt was not
done with the intent and purpose of unfairly diverting
tnuk from a competitor or otherwise injuring a comJ>ditor. The trial court conclnded that the Utah Unfair
11

Practices Act is unconstitutionally arbitrary and unreasonable in prohibiting a sale belo'v cost as defined by
the Act where the only intent of the retailer in pricing
the item below cost is to induce customers of the retailer
to purchase other merchandise. The Utah Supreme
Court did not consider this defense of Skaggs to Count
IV of plaintiff's complaint or the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the trial court with respect thereto,
altough the matter was presented to the Supreme Court '
on appeal. It is respectfully submitted that the decision
of the trial court on this point should be affirmed.
To begin with, Skaggs agrees entirely with the opinion of the court in this case that the legislature has the
power to prohibit sales below cost, which are made with
the intent, or which have the effect ,of overwhelming or
destroying competition. That, however, is not the situation which exists with respect to Count IV of plaintiff's
complaint. The statute purports to prohibit a merchant
in setting the price for his merchandise and in advertising that price, even though the merchant had no intent
to divert trade from a competitor or otherwise injure
a competitor and even though neither of these results
occurred. The Utah Supreme Court held in the case of
Pride Oil Co. vs. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 183,
370 P.2d ~55 (1962) that Article I Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution prohibits invasions of a person's right to
own and enjoy property and that this includes the right
to sell it and to let others know of the desire to do so
and the price. The court in that case properly recognized
that this right is not absolute and that when it appears
necessary for the protection of somemore important in-
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terest of the public, which involves the safeguarding of
its health, morals, safety, or welfare, this basic right
may be limited to the extent necessary to protect the
public interest.
"But a pivotal consideration in the problem
before us is that in order to justify encroachment
on the8e rights, such a danger to the public must
exist and the statute must he such that it will have
some substantial and reasonable relationship to
thP elimination or correction of the evil."
Most courts which have considered the question have
held that a balnket prohibition against sales below costs
is unconstitutional. A statute to be constitutional must
only prohibit sales below cost which are made with an
evil intent or which accomplish an evil result. Kansas
i:s. Fleming Co., 184 Kansas 674, 339 P.2d 12 (1959).
Englebrecht vs. Day, 201 Oklahoma 585, 208 P.2d 538
(1949), Commonwealth v. Zasloff, supra. As stated by
the Colorado SnprPme Court in Perkins vs. King Soopers,
l11r., 122 Colorado 263, 221 P.2d 343, (1950):
''Our stnclv of the decided cases leads to the
conclusion that· a statute attempting to prohibit all
8ales below cost would be unconstitutional, and
to avoid this result, only such sales may be prohihifrd which are intended to injure the public
in a manner warranting the exercise of the police
power."
The Trial conrt found that Skaggs in making the
sales complained of in Count IV of the complaint had
no intent to infairly divert trade from a competitor or
otherwise injure a competitor and plaintiff at no time
contended that either of these results were accomplished

13

by the sales. Plaintiff, in fact, never contended that
Skaggs intended to unfairly divert trade from a competitor or otherwise injure a competitor in connection
with the sales complained of in Count IV of plaintiff's
complaint. Under these circumstances, the decision of
the trial court insofar as Count IV of plaintiff's complaint is concerned should be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER
OR RULE UPON THE DEFENSE OF SKAGGS THAT
THE UT AH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF ITS UNJUSTIFIABLE
DISCRIMINAION BETWEEN PARTIES SIMILARLY
SITUATED ALTHOUGH THE MATTER WAS PRESENTED TO THE SUPREME COURT ON APPEAL.

The trial conrt concluded that the Utah Unfair Practices act is unconstitutional in its unjustifiable discrimination between persons similarly situated. The Utah
Supreme Court failed to consider or discuss this attack
upon the constitutionality of the statute. It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the trial conrt on
this point should be affirmed.

A statute is unconstitutional as being

discriminator~·

and in violation of the equal protection and due process
clauses of both the federal and state constitutions if it
differentiates between classes of persons similarly situated without any reasonable basis hearing on the purposl'
sought to be accomplished by tlw statute. State vs.
Packard, 122 Ut. 369, 250 P.2d 5ril (1952); Slater 1·s.
Salt Lake City, 115 Ut. 476, 20G P.2d 153 (1949); Gro11lund vs. Salt Lake City, 113 Ft. 284, 104 P.2d -±ii4 ( Hl48).
14

Several cases from other jurisdictions have held unfair
practices acts unconstitutional because of such discrimination. e.g. Kansas vs. Consumers' Warehouse Market
Inc., 185 Kans. 363, 343 P.2d 234 (1959); Wayne's Dis-'
tribidors, Inc., vs. Tilton, 7 N.J. 349, 81 At.2d 786 (1951);
Serrrr vs. Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio St. 519, 76
N.E.2d 91 (1947).
The Utah Unfair Practices Act unconstitutionally
discriminates between the ordinary retailer and the large
manufacturer-retailer. The ordinary retailer is prohibited from making a sale below costs as defined by the
Act, except where he endeavors, "to meet the legal prices
of a competitor." U.C.A. 13-5-12( d)
The sales of a large manufacturer-retailer are exempted from the provisions of the Act where they meet
"prices established in interstate competition regardless
of cost.'' This broad exemption granted to the manufacturer-retailer which is not permitted the small, ordinary retail merchant, is in complete opposition to the
avowed purpose of the Act ·which is set forth in 13-5-17
of the Act as follows:
"ThP k>gislatnre declared that the purpose
of tl1is Act is to safeguard the public against the
creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to
fostPr and encourage competition, by prohibiting
unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair
and honest competition is destroyed or prevented."
This unreasonable discrimination between the ex(·mptions granted the manufacturer-retailer and the
ordinary retailer is in direct conflict with the purpose
15

of the Act and makes the Act unconstitutional under the
rules laid down by this court in State 1'S. Packard, snpra.
The Act also discriminates without n·ason between
retailers who receive cash discounts on their purchasp
of merchandises and those who receive trade discounts.
In determining the minimum pricP at which a rdail<'r
may sell his goods, the statute permits a retailer who
receives a trade discount to deduct the trade discount
from the invoice price in determining the minimum price
at which he can advertise his goods for sale. The retailer
who receives a "customary cash discount" ma~· not d('duct this discount from his invoice price, howenr. 'rhis
merchant will thus be required to sell his goods at a
higllPr price than his competitor who received a trade
discount in spite of the fact that the net costs of the
items to the two retaih~rs is identical. It is impossible
to d0termine what reason tlwn• could possibly be for thi8
distinction. As this court held in the case of Sleater vs.
Salt Lake City, 115 Ut. 476, 206 P.2d 153 (19-±D), "If WP
are unable to find any reasonable basis for the classification, then we cannot sustain the Pnactnwnt."
POINT V
THE SUPREME COURT APPARENTLY OVERLOOKED THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL ESTABLISHING THE FACT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE
TO PROVE THE ACTUAL COST OF SELLING AN
ITEM OF MERCHANDISE AND ESTABLISHING
THAT CREDITS AND REBATES CANNOT BE APPLIED TO AN ITEM OF MERCHANDISE AT THE
TIME A RETAILER SETS THE PRICE OF THAT
MERCHANDISE FOR SALE.

It was the contention of ~kagg:-: that th<· Ftal1 1·nrair
PradicPs Act was unconstitutional lweau:-:u it erf'akil

an irrebutable presumption that a retailer's cost of doing
business is 6% of the invoice price of the goods. While
the language of the Act indicates that the pre~mmption is
not conclusive, the presumption is, in fact, conclusive
as shown by the testimony at the trial. Attributing a
"proportionate part of the cost of doing business" to an
item of merchandise sold by a modern retail merchant
handling hundreds of different items is impossible. The
Supreme Court apparently overlooked the testimony at
the trial concerning this matter and the findings of fact
of the trial court with respect thereto.
'!'he Supreme Court in this case held that the term
"c:ost" was not unconstitutionally arbitrary, unreasonable, vague and ambiguous and that the 6% markup
l'<'quired by the statute did not create an unconstitutional,
irrebutable presumption. The reasons given by the Supreme Court for this holding were that the trial court's
eonclnsion that the 6% presumption provides no real
alt1:•rnative because it is impractical or impossible to
prove actual cost was not supported by the evidence; the
eo:;t computation required by the Act need not be exact;
all that the statute requires is that a cost figure be
anivPd at by reasonable accounting methods; a reasonably accurate allocation of rebates and free goods given
to retailers could be made for the purposes of complying
with the Act, and therefore, the Act is sufficiently clear
to recp1ire compliance .
It appears that the Supreme Court overlooked the
findings of the trial court with respect to these points,
01· tlw testimony at the trial which supported these find-
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ings. The trial court found that Skaggs offers for sale
a wide variety of merchandise, each item of which has
individual cost factors, such as variance in consumer
demand, rate of turnover, advertising cost, warehousing,
marking, packaging, displaying, purchasing costs, depreciation, labor, overhead and administrative costs. In
addition, Skaggs receives trade and cash discounts with
respect to some items, some of which cannot be determined or are even known to Skaggs at the time the goods
are priced for sale. Skaggs used sound, accepted and
practical accounting procedures with as much emphasis
on detail as feasible, but it cannot reasonably be required
to establish accounting procedures whereby its actual
cost per item sold can be determined at or prior to the
offering of such item for sale. These findings are simply
supported by the testimony at the trial in this case.

In determining the price at which an item of merchandise is to be sold Section 13-5-7 ( b) ( 3) pro vi des that
the retailer is to take his invoice cost, deduct from this
all trade discounts except customary disco1mts for cash,
and then add 6% of the resulting figure to cover the
proportionate cost of doing business. In actual practice,
the retailer rpay not even knmY the amonnt of the trade
discounts which he is to dednct from the invoice until
long after the goods have been sold. Mr. Edwin K
Austin testified at the trial that a retailer often receives
free goods and rebates on his purchases after the end
of a quota period, depending upon the volnnw of sales
dnring the quota period. The amonnt of th<>se disconnt~.
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or whether the retailer will even receive a discount is
'
unknown to the retailer until long after he has sold the
merchandise. (R. 90-91). It is apparent that the Supreme
Court misread this testimony in reaching its conclusion
that these rebates and free goods could be computed by
a retailer with reasonable accuracy for the purpose of
pricing his merchandise.
Dean Randall of the University of Utah College of
Business testified in detail as to the difficulty encountered in attempting to attribute a "proportionate part
of tht> cost of doing business" to a particular item of
n1Prchandise. He concluded:
"In my opinion, in a retail store handling
thonsands of items, it wonld b0 economically impossible to arrive at a r0alistic cost of selling
each ikm.'' (R. 11 G)

It is not, as the Supreme Court concluded, a question of
"inconYenience or difficulty in application of the cost
standard" which is involved in this case. The application of the cost figure required by the statute is one that
i:-: "economically impossible" to comply with. The statutory presumption that a retailer's "cost of doing business'' is 6% of his invoice price thns becomes conclusive.
It is well established that a statutory conclusive presnmption is unconstitutional. Alder vs. Board of Ed1trntio11, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.ed. 517 (1952). As
~·fated by the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of
I'rrkins vs. King SoopPrs, Inc., supra, in holding a con('lusin presumption of the Colorado Unfair Practices
c\d nnconstitutional:
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"A legislatiw right to drclare that proof of
one fact shall ht> prt•sumptive or prima facie evidence of another is no longer open to serious dispntP in this jmisdictoion or elsewhc->re. [citing
cases] It may also be said in the light of the foregoing authorities that the power wskd in the
legislature to create such presumptions is subject
to the qualification that there must be some rational eonnection or reasonable relation between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact to be established; Also, s1tch poiucr is subject to the further
limitation that the presumption cannot be made
a conclusive one. (Emphasis is that of the Colorado Supreme Court.)
POINT VI
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OVERLOOKED CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE UTAH UNFAIR
PRACTICES ACT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS.

The trial court concluded that the Aet is uncomtitutionally vague and ambiguous in defining the prohibited intent of a retailer as making a salt~ at less than
cost as defined in the act with the intent and purpose
of "unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor." The Utah Supreme Court
reversed this decision of the trial court in the following
language:
"LikewisP ·we diPagree witl1 the trial court drcision that the terms "1mfairl.'; diverting tradl'
from a competitor'' and "in.inrmg a competitor''
are vague and amhig1 1 011s. 11hP t('rms may prPsent diffic11ltiPs in ap1>lication, hnt such difficnJt:·
is not sufficient to hold tlw ad nneonstitntional.
In faet, the Paid tPrms luff(' coin<' to hw<' <1<>finit
1
'
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and certain meanings in the practice of wholesale
and retail business."
If the terms did, in fact, have definite and certain
meanings in the wholesale and retail business, the terms
would not be vague and ambiguous and subject to constitutional attack. In fact ,however, the terms have no
meaning whatsoever in the wholesale and retail business.
1'here is not a shred of testimony in the record that they
have a definite and certain meaning or that anyone has
any idea as to what the terms mean.

The Supreme Court acknowledges that the terms
may present "difficulties in application." It is this difficulty in application, arising out of the terms used, which
causes the Act to be unconstitutional. The basic test
of constitutionality which the Supreme Court apparently
overlooked in this case and which it should have applied
is that laid down by this court in the case of State vs.
Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). There the
court stated:
"A statnte which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ ns to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law ... " (Emphasis is that of Petitioner)
The difficulties of application of the statute which
are recognized by the Utah Supnm1e Court make the
statute too vague to inform a retailer what his conduct
must be in order to avoid violating the Act; make the
Ad too indefinite to inform a retailer accused of violating its provisions what constitutes the offense with which
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he is charged; and prevents uniform interpretation and
application of the Act by those charged with enforcing it.
It thus violates the basic test of constitutionality laid
down by the Utah Supreme Court in the State vs. Packard case as follows :
"ConcPrning the cpwstion of uncertainty or
vagueness of statutes, the anthorities seem t'o h~
in accord that the test a statute must meet to be
valid is: It mnst bP sufficiently definite (a) to
inform persons of ordinar~·1 intelligence, who would
be law abiding, what their conduct must be to conform to its requirements; (b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just what constitutes
the offense with which he is charged, and ( c) to
be susceptible of uniform interpretation and application by those charged with the rPsponsibility
of applying and enforcing it."
POINT VII
THE SUPREME COURT MISREAD THE PRESUMPTION OF ILLEGAL INTENT WHICH IS CREATED
BY SECTION 13-5-9 (2) OF THE UTAH UNFAIR
PRACTICES ACT AND APPARENTLY 0 VER LOOKED THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL AND
CONROLLING PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW CONCERNING SUCH PRESUMPTION IN CONNECTION WITH COUNT VI OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

Section 13-5-9 (2) of the Utah lfofair Practices Act
provides that proof of a limitation of quantity coupled
with proof ·of a sale below cost as dPfirn~d by the Act
creates a presumption that the purpose or intent with
which the sale was made was to "injure competitors or
destroy competition." The section provides:
"(2) Undt>r this section, proof of limitation of
the qnantity of an~- nrtic1P or product sold or
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offered for sale to any one customer of a quantity
less than the entire snpp1y thereof owned or possessed by the seller or which he is otherwise authorizPd to sell at the place of such sale or offering for sale, together with proof that the price
at which the article or product is so sold or offered
for sale is in fact below its cost, raises a presmnption of the pnrpose or the intent of the sale being
to injure competitors or destroy competition, and
is unlawful. ... "
The Supreme Court apparently misread the presumption which is created by this Section. In its opinion
on this point, the court stated:
"A sale by the respondents at the low cost
with the limitation of quantity obviously disregards both profit and turnover which combined
constitute the whole purpose of being in business.
1-Gvm the most simple analysis would then lead
all reasonable persons to conclude that the respondents had an intent by this activity to attract
customers into the store upon the expectation that
they wonld purchase other items not marked below cost."
The section does not crt>ate the presumption that the sale
was made with the intent of including the purchase of
other merchandise. Tlw intent which is presumed by
the statute is that the retailer intended to "injure competitors or destroy competition."
The constitutionality of a statutory presumption de]H'nds upon whether the fact presumed may be fairly
inferred from the fact proYen. Tot vs. United States,
:319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 519 (1943); Aldrr
1 s. Board of Editcation, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L.

Ed. 517 (1952). To paraphrase the Utah Supreme Court
in the instant case, even the most simple analysis wo11ld
lead all reasonable persons to conclude that the respondent had an intent by this activity entirely different from
the intent which is presumed by the statute.
Even assuming hat the presumption of illegal intent
created by Section 13-5-9 (2) was constitutional and
could be fairly inferred from the facts proven, the court
has overlooked the testimony of Skaggs at the trial that
there was no illegal intent involved in connection with
Count VI of plaintiff's complaint. Count VI of plaintiff's complaint alleged that on June 20, 1966, Skaggs
advertised Polaroid Swinger Cameras at $13.49 each,
which were at less than cost as defined by the Act, and
that Skaggs limited the purchase of tlwse cameras to
one per customer. The uncontradicted testimony of Mr.
Austin concerning this matter was that the cameras were
offered for sale by Skaggs to introduce customers to a
new store which was opened at 8th West in Salt Lake
City. The advertisement was made to get people to come
in and look at and become acquaint0d v\Tith the new
store. The reason that the cameras w<:>re limited to one
per customer was that Polaroid Cameras at that time
were on allocation by the manufactnrer and the suppl:·
was therefore limited. Skaggs felt thl'y 'rnulcl haH
enough cameras to supply the demand if the camNas
were limited to one per customPr. Skaggs fplt it wa'
jnstifiecl in limiting- one canwrn per customer so that ii
"·ould be able to supply all of its customers in that
area. Mr. Austin also testified that it is often neeessar:
"·hen offering an item at a partienlarl.v attractive pricv
2-±

to limit the quantity to be sold to one per customer in
order to prevent raids by competitors who attempt to
come in and purchase the entire stock of that item.
(H. 88-90). The Supreme Court apparently overlooked
this undisputed testimony in connection with Count VI
of plaintiff's complaint.

POINT VIII
THE SUPREME COURT APPARENTLY OVERLOOKED ITS OWN PRIOR DECISIONS IN HOLDING THAT THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT
DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE XII, SECTION 20
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

It was the contention of Skaggs and the decision
of the trial court that the Utah Unfair Practices Act is
an unconstitutional price fixing statute in violation of
Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution. This
decision of the trial court was reversed by the Utah
Snpreme Court on appeal. 'l'he reasons given by the Supreme Court were (1) That there "\Vas no evidence as to
whctlwr there was a real alternative of a lesser cost and
(2) the Legislatun~ has not been precluded by the Utah
Constitntion from price fixing.

As pointed out in Point V of this brief, there was
amrile testimony at the trial to support the finding of the
trial court that there was no real alternative of proving
a lesser cost. The testimony of Dean Randall which is
quoted above, was that it was "economically impossible"
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to arrive at a realistic cost of selling an item of merchandise. The retailer thus has no alternative but to fix
the minimum price for his merchandise at the im'oice
cost plus 6% dictated bv the statute.
The Supreme Court in holding that Article XII,
Section 20 of the Utah Constitution does not apply to
the Legislature, has apparently overlooked its own prior
decisions which have relied on Article XII, Section 20 in
holding acts of the Legislature to be unconstitutional.
In 1961 the Utah Legislature enacted Sections 41-1145 and 46, which regulated and restricted service station
advertising of gasoline prices. 'T'he ostensible purpose
of the statute >vas to prevent false and misleading adyertising. The constitutionality of these sections were
attacked in the case of PridP Oil Co. vs. Salt Lake Coiwty,
13 U.2d 183, 370 P.2d 355 (1962). The Utah Supreme
Court found that the real purpose of the statute was the
control of gasoline prices and the elimination of gas wars.
The Supreme Court held the act of the Legislature unconstitutional and the only constitutional provision cited
by the Utah Supreme Court was Article XII, Section 20
of the Utah Constitution.

In the ·case of General Electric Company vs. Thrifty
Sales, 5 U.2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956), the Constitutionality of the Utah Fair Trade Act ·was attacked as being
in violation of Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution. The contention was made in that case, "that
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tht> constitutional provision, obviously aimed at private
combinations from indulging in price fixing for monopolistic purposes, was not intended to prevent the legisia tnre from enacting laws authorizing agreements for the
wholesome purposes set forth above." This contention
was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. The court
stated that it was clear that retailers could not voluntarily enter into contracts with each other to fix the price
of merchandise. The Act, however, purportedly furnished
them with a device whereby retailers were forced by
8tatute to set minimum prices for the sale of their merehandi st', which they could not have done by private
agreement. The court held, not only that the contract in
question was unconstitutional, but that "the act is invalid
under Section 20, Article XII of our constitution."

In Gammon vs. Federated Milk Producers Association, Inc., ll U.2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018 (1961), the Utah
~npreme Court stated that if the Utah Agricultural Cooperative Act were construed as authorizing the establishment of minimum prices for milk that the Act itself
wonld he unconstitutional as heing in violation of Article
XII, 8ection 20 of the Utah Constitution.
'l'he majority opinion of the Supreme Court in this
case apparently overlooked its prior decisions which held
legislatin price fixing unconstitutional in violation of
Article XII, Section 20, of the Utah Constitution. As
ably i1ointed out in tht~ dissenting opinion of Justice
l'~llett in this case, and by Chief Justice Crockett in the
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General Electric Company case, supra, retailers contd
not by an agreement among themselves compell each
other to charge a minimum price for their merchandise.
It would clearly seem unconstitutional for the legis.
lature to pass a law compelling retailers to do that which
would be unconstitutional for them to do otherwise.
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H. R. ·waldo, Jr.
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